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NOTES
THE PREEMPTION DOCTRINE: SHIFTING
PERSPECTIVES ON FEDERALISM AND
THE BURGER COURT
Federal and state governments have committed intensified concern and
energy toward finding cooperative solutions to the common problems con-
fronting them. The notion of cooperative federalism' has emerged from these
efforts to reconstruct intergovernmental relations. Administratively, it long
has been manifested in program coordination and formal and informal ex-
changes of information. Legislatively, it stands behind federal grants-in-aid
for education, urban renewal and housing.2 The innovation of revenue-sharing,
with its removal of all but minimal restrictions upon state expenditures,3 has
left to the states and municipalities a greater share of policymaking respon-
sibility over federally financed programs.
4
This movement in areas once subject to federal centralization5 is re-
flected in several recent Supreme Court decisions. The Burger Court has
upheld state action in areas such as public education, apportionment and ob-
scenity to which the Warren Court had vigorously applied federal policies.
The Court has displayed a considerable receptivity to maintaining the diversity
of state and local institutions and interests.
6
These developments have also worked an influence on one of the primary
judicial vehicles for shaping federalism-the preemption doctrine. Federal
preemption is invoked under the directive of the supremacy clause,7 either to
1. Cooperative federalism regards federal and state governments as "mutually com-
plementary parts of a single governmental mechanism all of whose powers are intended
to realize the current purposes of government according to their applicability to the
problem in hand." Wright, The Advisory Commissionr on Intergovernmental Relations:
Unique Features and Policy Orientation, 25 PuB. AD. REv. 193, 199-200 n.26 (1965).
2. See Grad, Federal-State Compact: A New Experiment in Co-operative Federalism,
63 COLUm. L. Rav. 825, 830-32 (1963); cf. Comment, The Impact of Preemption on
Federal State Co-operation, 1967 U. ILL. L.F. 656, 656-57 (1967).
3. See 31 U.S.C. §§ 1221-63 (Supp. II, 1972).
4. Cf. Grad, supra note 2, at 833.
5. See Engdahl, Preemptive Capability of Federal Power, 45 U. CoLo. L. REv. 51
(1973).
6. Substantive rules affecting the states under the equal protection clause reflect the
change. Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163, 1,76-77 (1972), for example, dem-
onstrated the state action requirement of the fourteenth amendment to be a real limita-
tion. The Court has also established flexible equal protection standards to govern the
apportionment of state legislatures. See Mahan v. Howell, 410 U.S. 315, 328-29 (1973) ;
Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 735, 737, 740-41 (1973). Deference to the value of local
control over public education underlies the Court's rulings in opposition to multi-district
desegregation orders, see Milliken v. Bradley, 94 S. Ct. 3112, 3125-26 (1974), and in sup-
port of school district property tax financing, see San Antonio Independent School Dist. v.
Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 48-50 (1973). Similarly, the Court's decisions in the obscenity area
bespeak a respect for local community standards. See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15,
30 (1973).
7. This constitution and the Laws of the United States which shall be made
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effectuate a congressional occupation of a particular field, even where there
are gaps in the federal regulatory scheme, or to nullify state regulation in
conflict with federal legislation.8 The doctrine thus serves to define spheres
of governmental authority within the federal system. It has been utilized exten-
sively since the federal regulatory advances of the New Deal period to mediate
the frictions that have attended the steady extension of detailed federal regu-
lation into formerly exclusive provinces of the statesY The Supreme Court,
however, has not developed a uniform approach to preemption; its decisions
in this area take on an ad hoc, unprincipled quality, seemingly bereft of any
consistent doctrinal basis. It is the purpose of this Note to survey the pre-
emption decisions for strands of doctrinal consistency and to examine the im-
pact of the Burger Court's favorable disposition to concurrent state-federal
regulation on the preemption doctrine.
I. THE PREEMPTION DOCTRINE: ITS ROOTS AND ITS
CONTEMPORARY DEVELOPMENT
A. The Prevailing Formulation of the Doctrine'0
Preemption occurs when a state statute obstructs the "accomplishment and
execution of the full purposes and objectives of an Act of Congress."" More
specifically, either a congressional design to "occupy the field" or a conflict
between federal and state statutes 2 is needed to place a state statute in an
unconstitutionally obstructive position.
in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under
Authority of the United States, shall be the Supreme Law of the Land; and
the Judges in every state shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution
or Laws of any State to the Contrary not withstanding.
U.S. CoNsT. art. VI, § 2. For the view that the necessary and proper clause, id. art. I,
§ 8, imposes a duty upon the Supreme Court to allocate power within the federal system
independent of congressional directives, see Freeman, Dynamic Federalism and the Con-
cept of Preemption, 21 DE PAUL L. REv. 630, 638-39 (1972).
As used in this Note, preemption is the invalidation of state legislation under the
supremacy clause for incompatibility with a federal regulatory scheme. Because preemption
implies the existence of federal legislation, a determination invalidating a state law under a
clause of the Constitution, in the absence of a statute in the manner of a traditional com-
merce clause case, see, e.g., Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona ex rel. Sullivan, 325 U.S. 761
(1945), falls outside of the definition.
8. Cf. Freeman, supra note 7, at 630; see also C. McGoWAN, TuIE ORGANIZATION OF
THE JUDIcIAL POWER IN THE UNITED STATES 48 (1969).
9. C. McGOwAN, supra note 8, at 40.
10. Certain inherent characteristics of the preemption cases contribute to the need
for a broad overview of the doctrinal development. The traditional technique of deriving
law by reconciling decisions is not entirely appropriate in this context. This problem can
be ascribed in part to the subsidiary questions of statutory interpretation and the variant
questions of federal policy inevitably involved in each case. Cf. Hirsch, Toward a New
View of Federal Preemption, 1972 U. ILL. L.F. 515, 535.
Beyond the aspects unique to the individual case, internal consistency among the
preemption cases as a whole is prevented by the coexistence of fundamentally different
approaches to the doctrine. This difficulty is the principal concern of the present section
of this Note.
11. Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941).
12. Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 141 (1963).
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1. The Occupation Ground. A congressional design to occupy the field
supersedes the operation of state law on federally regulated subject matter
whether or not state regulation impairs the actual operation of the federal law.
A finding of congressional occupation requires a showing that it is "the clear
and manifest purpose of Congress" that an area be exclusively federally regu-
lated.' 3 In ascertaining the preemptive scope of federal legislation under the
occupation ground, however, the Supreme Court has not relied exclusively
upon expressions of congressional purpose or specific intent. In Rice v. Santa
Fe Elevator Corp.'4 Justice Douglas stated that other objective factors may
establish the requisite preemptive intent:
The scheme of federal regulation may be so pervasive as to make rea-
sonable the inference that Congress left no room for the States to
supplement it.... Or an Act of Congress may touch a field in which
the federal interest is so dominant that the federal system will be
assumed to preclude enforcement of state laws on the same subject.
... Likewise, the object sought to be obtained by the federal law and
the character of obligations imposed by it may reveal the same pur-
pose .... 15
In addition, considerations completely extrinsic to the federal legislation
at issue may weigh heavily in the preemptive determination. The nature of
the regulated subject matter, for example, may reveal an inherent need for
nationwide uniformity and federal primacy.' This approach, stemming from
the early commerce clause cases,17 denominates certain subject matter as
national in character, and hence preemptive without regard to congressional
action,' 8 and other subject matter as inherently local, and hence admitting of
diverse regulation. This approach is problematic, however, for the cases have
not uniformly treated subject matter as a preemptive ground independent of
any congressional action or intent; often, it has been treated as only one index
of a congressional design to occupy a field. 19
13. Id. at 146.
14. 331 U.S. 218 (1947).
15. Id. at 230.
16. See, e.g., Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142
(1963).
17. It can be traced to Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 298, 319-20
(1851).
18. The Court's transplant of the subject matter approach from the early commerce
clause cases to the statutory preemption context in Florida Lime & Avocado Growers,
Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142 (1963), is somewhat anomalous. When the Court character-
izes certain subject matter as local in character for commerce clause purposes, Congress
can always correct it by entering the field. See generally Hunt, Federal Supremacy and
State Anti-Subversive Legislation, 53 MIcH. L. Rxv. 407, 418-19 (1955). In the pre-
emption context, however, Congress has acted, although it may not have completely
covered the field, and for the Court to find against preemption it must disregard the con-
gressional determination that the subject matter is national in character.
19. Thus in both Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 144
(1963), and Head v. New Mexico Board of Examiners, 374 U.S. 424, 430 (1963), the
Court characterized the subject matter as local but then went on to determine whether
Congress intended occupation of the fields at issue.
Where the Court has found the subject matter to be national in character, it may
1975]
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2. The Conflict Ground. Under the conflict ground 20 of preemption,
the Court first construes the state and federal statutes in question and then
determines whether a true conflict exists. 21 The clearest conflict case arises
when a federal law mandates action forbidden by state law, or vice versa. As
the scope of state interference with a federal legislative scheme diminishes,
however, the presence of conflict becomes progressively more subtle.2 2 Federal
and state laws that operate in completely unrelated spheres obviously present
no constitutionally cognizable conflict.
3. Shifting Presumptions as Doctrine. Although the preemption doc-
trine, as thus summarized, appears to be both principled and neutral in applica-
tion, it has been the object of considerable political manipulation during the
past forty years. For a period of time, the Supreme Court's preemption deci-
sions consistently supported state interests, sacrificing federal legislative ob-
jectives in the process. This state-directed view of preemption dominated the
Court's thinking in the 1930's, cresting in the succeeding decade. In the 1940's,
a federal-directed formulation of the preemption doctrine-in which federal
legislative interests were regarded as paramount-emerged. Federal-directed
preemption dominated the Court's jurisprudence in the 195 0's and early 1960's,
but as will be seen, 23 several recent decisions of the Burger Court presage a
return to a state-directed preemption doctrine. This doctrinal inconsistency
merely manifests the Court's vacillating perspective on federalism. At the risk
of overstating the dichotomy's pervasiveness, the following general discussion
of preemption will consider the state-directed and federal-directed doctrines
separately.
B. The Period of Judicial Solicitude of State Interests
1. The Clear Intent Standard for Occupation of the Field. For many
years, the mere fact of congressional regulation in a particular field precluded
appear to be relying on the subject matter approach as dispositive of the preemption is-
sue, but it usually seizes upon that characterization after concluding from an inquiry into
congressional intent drawing from the federal statute at issue that there is a need for
national uniformity. See Evansville-Vanderburgh Airport Authority Dist. v. Delta Air-
lines, Inc., 405 U.S. 707, 720-21 (1972) ; Campbell v. Hussey, 368 U.S. 297, 300-02 (1961).
20. Although the Court's convention of distinguishing between occupation of the field
and conflict will be honored here, an absolute distinction between the two concepts should
not be inferred. Occupation of the field implies that any state regulation would conflict
either with the federal statute's terms or operation, or with congressional intent. The
Court on occasion omits to categorize a case as involving one or the other ground before
proceeding with its analysis. See, e.g., Chicago v. Atchison T. & S.F. Ry., 357 U.S. 77,
87-89 (1958).
21. Perez v. Campbell, 402 U.S. 637, 644 (1971). The term "conflict" covers consider-
able stretches of semantic territory. The Court uses conflict, interference, repugnance, ir-
reconcilability, inconsistency, and similar words more or less interchangeably. See Hirsch,
supra note 10, at 525.
22. The most difficult conflict question arises when federal and state statutes apply
to entirely different areas of subject matter but meet at a common point. See, e.g., Perez
v. Campbell, 402 U.S. 637 (1971) (conflict between federal regulation of bankruptcy and
state restrictions on automobile negligence judgment debtors); Huron Portland Cement
Co. v. City of Detroit, 362 U.S. 440 (1960) (federal maritime safety requirements and
municipal pollution regulation).
23. See notes 108-224 and accompanying text infra.
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concurrent state legislation.24 In the 1930's, however, the Supreme Court
abandoned expansive judicial assessments of federally regulated subject mat-
ter, transferring to the Congress primary responsibility for accomplishing pre-
emption. Absent an "actual conflict" between federal and state law, preemption
could only occur if congressional intent to occupy the field was "definitely and
clearly" shown.25 Although the evidentiary burden necessary to satisfy this
standard remained obscure, it was apparent that the Court preferred an ex-
pression of specific intent to occupy the field. Yet notwithstanding this high
threshold requirement, the Court did permit inferential demonstration of pre-
emptive congressional purpose in the proper case.
26
The clear intent requirement for occupation found a correlative in the
actual conflict standard.2 7 As with the inclusion of purpose under the occu-
pation ground, actual conflict went beyond the context of provisions expressly
mandating different action to encompass the more flexible concept of frustra-
tion of purpose. The Court would ascertain the purposes "necessarily implied"
in a federal statutory scheme, and strike down any state law that inhibited
their accomplishment.
28
These standards, however, did not provide the Court with self-sufficient
decisional bases. Fields of subject matter and conflicts were not absolutes to
be established and imposed without regard to the interests at stake. The amount
of ground occupied beyond a federal statute's terms29 and the evidence of
24. See, e.g., Charleston & W. Carolina Ry. Co. v. Varnville Furniture Co., 237 U.S.
597, 604 (1915) (Holmes, J.). Under this formulation, the sole question had been whether
Congress had reached the subject matter dealt with by the state law, and therefore only
concerned the size of the field occupied. The view was that the very exercise of federal
power inherently excluded concurrent regulation by the states even where the operation of
the state statute was entirely compatible with the federal scheme. See id., Engdahl, supra
note 5, at 52-55.
25. Mintz v. Baldwin, 289 U.S. 346, 350 (1933). Variations in phrasing can be found
in Maurer v. Hamilton, 309 U.S. 598, 614 (1940) ("clearly indicated"), and H.P. Welsh
Co. v. New Hampshire, 306 U.S. 79, 85 (1939) ("definitely expressed").
26. See, e.g., Maurer v. Hamilton, 309 U.S. 598, 614 (1940). See also Comment, Pre-
eniption as a Preferential Ground: A New Canon of Construction, 12 STAN. L. Rxv. 208,
210 (1959).
27. For an early case requiring actual conflict, see Savage v. Jones, 225 U.S. 501,
533 (1912).
28. Id.; see also David v. Elmira Savings Bank, 161 U.S. 275, 283 (1896). For more
recent "frustration of purpose" conflict cases, see Nash v. Florida Indus. Comm'n, 389 U.S.
235, 238-39 (1967) (state statute refusing compensation for unemployment due to labor
disputes as applied to an employee filing a charge with the National Labor Relations Board
held to frustrate congressional purpose in encouraging such filings) ; Hill v. Florida, 325
U.S. 538, 541-42 (1945) (state statute conditioning the functioning of a union's collective
bargaining representative upon the fulfillment of certain state requirements held to frus-
trate congressional guarantee of "full freedom" to select representatives).
Although frustration of purpose permits considerable flexibility in finding preemptive
conflicts, it remains grounded in subjective congressional intent. Later criteria, which
disregarded the intent limitation, permitted even greater flexibility. See text accompanying
notes 80-83 infra.
29. The field's extent frequently is the point of contention, but precise bounds
usually must be derived by inference from purpose interpretation. The difficulty of such
inquiry stems from the fact that
[flederal law is generally interstitial in nature. It rarely occupies a legal field
completely .... Federal legislation, on the whole, has been conceived and drafted
on an ad hoc basis to accomplish limited objectives. ...
1975]
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intent required to demonstrate that occupation, or the degree of conflict nec-
essary to invalidate a state statute, were evaluated by reference to the nature
of the state law challenged; and the Court paid great deference to the state
interests at stake.
The decisions during this period involved federal statutes under the com-
merce power and state police power enactments.3 0 The Court generally sus-
tained concurrent state legislation in federally regulated fields, declaring itself
especially reluctant to infer congressional intent to preempt "when public
safety and health are concerned."'' l In effect, the Court created a presumption
favoring the validity of state laws in exercise of the police power.32 Once the
state presumption was triggered, only a strong showing of congressional in-
tent to occupy the field could effectively rebut it. Absent such conclusive evi-
dence,'3 the Court tended to uphold state regulation in fields not specifically
embraced by federal statute.
34
2. The Actual Conflict Standard and Flexible Federal Supremacy. In
occupation cases, a strict intent standard restricts the federal sphere to ex-
P. BATOR, P. MISHKIN, D. SHAPIRO & H. WECHSLER, HART & WECHSLER'S TILE FEDERAL
COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEm 470-71 (2d ed. 1973).
30. See Maurer v. Hamilton, 309 U.S. 598 (1940) and H.P. Welch Co. v. New
Hampshire, 306 U.S. 79 (1939) (Motor Carrier Act of 1935, 49 U.S.C. §§ 301-27 (1970),
and state highway safety regulations) ; Kelly v. Washington, 302 U.S. 1 (1937) (Motor
Boat Act of 1910, ch. 268, 36 Stat. 462, and state provision for inspection and regulation
of vessels) ; Mintz v. Baldwin, 289 U.S. 346 (1933) (Cattle Contagious Diseases Act of
1903, 21 U.S.C. §§ 120-22 (1970), and state animal quarantine laws).
31. Maurer v. Hamilton, 309 U.S. 598, 614 (1940).
Z. Even in redefining the criteria to be used in ascertaining congressional intent in
Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Co., 331 U.S. 218 (1947), see text accompanying note 15
supra, Justice Douglas observed that "we start with the assumption that the historic police
powers of the States were not to be superseded by the Federal Act unless that was the
clear and manifest purpose of Congress." Id. at 230.
33. In Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 236 (1947), for example, the
Court held that a clause in a federal regulatory statute stating federal jurisdiction to be
exclusive over all persons licensed thereunder expressed a specific intent to preempt state
jurisdiction.
34. In H.P. Welch Co. v. New Hampshire, 306 U.S. 79 (1939), for example, the
Court held valid a state statute limiting commercial drivers to a maximum number of
hours more restrictive than an enacted but unimplemented maximum in a pervasive
federal statute. In the absence of a clearly expressed congressional intention to preempt,
the Court found controlling New Hampshire's interest in protecting life and property by
regulating motor vehicles.
Similarly, in California v. Zook, 336 U.S. 725 (1949), Congress had legislated against
the sale or arrangement of transportation by carriers possessing no interstate commerce
permit. Although the concurrent legislative schemes exposed violators to multiple criminal
prosecutions, the Court drew no inference of intent to preempt, so long as preemption was
unnecessary to the accomplishment of Congress' purposes. See id. at 737-38.
The state-directed balancing prevalent in Welsh and Zook also characterized tile
first preemption cases involving the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), 29 U.S.C.
§§ 151-168 (1970). In Electrical Workers Local 1111 v. Wisconsin Employment Relations
Bd., 315 U.S. 740 (1942) (the Allen-Bradley case), the police power presumption was
invoked to sustain a prohibition of mass picketing. The Court held that the NLRA was
not preemptive, viewing the Act's failure to expressly address the problem as evidence of
a congressional design to leave the field open. Id. at 741-42, 748-50. The Allen-Bradley
rule was reapplied to support a state statute prohibiting intermittent, unannounced work
stoppages in Local 232, UAW v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Bd., 336 U.S. 245
(1949). The NLRA again having neither legalized nor forbidden the activity, the state's
police power was not superseded. Id. at 248-50, 264-65.
[Vol. 75:623
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press congressional coverage, allowing states to vindicate their interests with-
out impinging upon the principle of federal supremacy. The federal reach is
delimited by the absence of a clear congressional directive for extension. Actual
conflict, on the other hand, exists irreducably on the facts, and absolute federal
supremacy requires preemption without regard to the strength of the state
interests. To balance federal and state interests in the conflict context, then,
impinges upon absolute supremacy.
In Huron Portland Cement Co. v. City of Detroit35 and Kesler v. Depart-
ment of Public Safety36 the Court applied the state presumption to conflict
situations, and proved willing to leave vital state interests undisturbed. But it
could not do so, as it had done in occupation-of-the-field cases, by simply re-
quiring greater proof of congressional intent. Rather, it was forced to overlook
minor conflicts, which were only peripheral to the federal statutes' purposes.37
In Huron, the Court managed to bypass the absolute supremacy issue by over-
looking the express terms of the federal and state statutes, and restricting its
inquiry to their dominant purposes. Because the purposes were totally unre-
lated, it found no conflict. 38 But in Kesler, the Court directly considered
whether even minor conflicts between the federal and state legislative schemes
mandated preemption. Finding that conflicts bearing on peripheral concerns of
the federal scheme were tolerable under the supremacy clause, Justice Frank-
furter enunciated a principle of federal supremacy flexible enough to allow the
magnitude of the conflict to be balanced against the interests at stake.
In taking this step, Justice Frankfurter reached the conclusion dictated by
the concept of federalism that underlies a preemption doctrine constructed
around state interests. The concept of flexible supremacy in conflict cases, like
35. 362 U.S. 440 (1960).
36. 369 U.S. 153 (1962).
37. In Huron a municipal smoke abatement ordinance prohibited action which was
implicitly permitted by federal ship licensing requirements. The Court refused to find
conflict, for to do so "would be to ignore the teaching of this Court's decisions which
enjoin seeking out conflicts between state and federal regulation where none clearly
exist." Id. at 446. But as Justices Douglas and Frankfurter pointed out in dissent, the
federal license provided credentials, good in any port, for the very equipment forbidden
by the ordinance. Id. at 450-53. A more defensible rationale for the majority's result would
have been to acknowledge the existence of conflict but find that the strength of the state's
concern with air pollution outweighed the minimal harm to the federal regulatory scheme.
Such an approach was taken in Kesler, where the Court emphasized the divergent
purposes of the state and federal statutes to minimize the extent of an admitted conflict.
The Court upheld a statute suspending a motor vehicle negligence defendant's driver's
license at his judgment creditor's behest, despite the former's discharge in bankruptcy.
The statute was held to be pursuant to the state police power, and not for the mulcted
creditor's relief. That power, wrote the Court, should be respected "unless there is a
clear collision with a national law which has the right of way .. " Id. at 172. The Court
concluded that conflict between the statutes did not rise to the level of a supremacy clause
"collision," since "the bearing of the (state) statute on the purposes served by bankruptcy
legislation is essentially tangential." Id. at 174. Kesler was overruled in Perez v. Campbell,
402 U.S. 637 (1971) ; see notes 97-99 and accompanying text infra.
38. The Court will no longer sustain state legislation conflicting in terms, but not
in purpose, with federal law. The Kesler-Huron result was expressly repudiated in Florida
Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142 (1963), and again in Perez v.
Campbell, 402 U.S. 637, 651-52 (1971) ; see notes 97-99 and accompanying text infra.
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the rigorously construed intent standard in occupation-of-the-field cases, in-
sulates from preemptive attack many state laws vulnerable under preexisting
theory. The test for impermissible conflict that emerges from the cases-"an
obvious and unavoidable conflict" 39-was not, however, without precedent.
Indeed, Alexander Hamilton espoused such a theory in tle Federalist Papers,
noting that because
concurrent jurisdiction was "clearly admitted by the whole tenor" of
the Constitution .... "[i]t is not ... a mere possibility of inconve-
nience in the exercise of powers, but an immediate constitutional re-
pugnancy that can by implication alienate and extinguish a preexist-
ing right of sovereignty.
'40
To sum up, during the decades of solicitude for state interests state di-
versity as well as federal uniformity were safeguarded under a restrained
approach to federalism. The preemption doctrine went only so far as to pro-
tect the operative sphere of federal legislation specified by Congress. Other-
wise, its mechanisms were designed to serve state interests.
C. The Period of Judicial Solicitude of Federal Interests
1. Hines v. Davidowitz and an Altered Constitutional Framework. The
state-directed scheme of preemption developed in the service of legislation in
exercise of the commerce power. In its 1941 decision in Hines v. Davidowit.r,
4'
the Supreme Court considered for the first time the preemptive force of con-
gressional legislation deriving from other than the commerce power.12 The
issue was whether the Alien Registration Act of 1940, 4 3 which required aliens
to register with the federal government and carry identification cards, pre-
empted a Pennsylvania act with a similar registration procedure but carrying
more extensive criminal sanctions. 44 Under the state-directed view, a showing
of intent to occupy the field or actual conflict would have been a necessary
prerequisite to a finding of preclusion. Yet notwithstanding the absence of
either index, Justice Black, relying upon the statute's genesis in Congress'
foreign affairs power,45 erected a presumption in favor of the federal law's
preemptive capability. The statute belonged "to that class of laws which con-
cern the exterior relation of this whole nation with other nations"'4 and was
39. Farmers Educ. & Cooperative Union of America v. WDAY, Inc., 360 U.S. 525,
541 (1959) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
40. THE FEDERALIST No. 32, at 200 (Van Doren ed. 1945), quoted in Farmers Educ. &
Cooperative Union of America v. WDAY, Inc., 360 U.S. 525, 546 (1951) (Frankfurter, J.,
dissenting).
41. 312 U.S. 52 (1941).
42. See note 48 inIra.
43. Ch. 439, 54 Stat. 670. The statute was repealed by the Act of June 27, 1952,
8 U.S.C. §§ 1301-06 (1970).
44. 312 U.S. at 59. The federal act imposed criminal sanctions only upon failure to
register, while the Pennsylvania act did so upon the alien's failure to have the registration
card in his possession. Id.
45. See generally L. HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE CONSTITUTION 67-88 (1972).




"so intimately blended and intertwined with the responsibilities of the national
government" 47 as to present on its face "a complete scheme of regulation" in




Although the Hines result was undoubtedly influenced by the nature of
the regulated subject matter, the Court did not hold the foreign affairs power
to be a self-sufficient basis of preemption. Consistent with prior authority, it
recognized that the enactment of a federal statute, without more, did not
preclude all state legislative efforts. Rather, some measure of intent was
necessary for Congress to accomplish preemption. In retreating from a rigorous
intent standard, however, Hines broke new constitutional ground. The Court
redefined the judicial function in preemption cases, demanding a determination
whether the state statute under scrutiny "stands as an obstacle to the full
purposes and objectives of Congress. '49 This approach substituted a pur-
portedly objective assessment of the needs attending a statute's operation for
the practice of defining the occupied field through total reliance upon Con-
gress' subjective will.5° It amounted to a judicial assumption of competence to
find preemption, notwithstanding the absence of clear congressional intent to
occupy the field or actual conflict, when the nature of the federal regulation
called for exclusive operation.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 66-67. The Hines foreign affairs power-based presumption resembled the
approach taken to preemption as a whole during the late nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries. Under the early view of the Court, federal entry into a field served to foreclose
state regulation entirely, without regard to congressional intent or the statute's actual
scope. See note 24 supra.
Justice Black's reading of the foreign affairs power's preemptive capability, however,
did not command the entire Court's acquiescence. Justice Stone, with Chief Justice Hughes
and Justice McReynolds, dissented, holding fast to a presumption favoring the state's
police power. 312 U.S. at 75. The majority stressed the importance of legislation on
immigration, naturalization and deportation, taken as a whole, in the broader scheme of
the nation's foreign relations. Id. at 62-64. The dissenters refused so to extend the reach
of the foreign affairs power into aspects of the maintenance of internal order. Id. at 76-77.
If one ascribes greater preemptive force to the foreign affairs power than to the
commerce power, then Hines may be reconciled with prior doctrine. In one case, the
Supreme Court acknowledged that such a difference may exist. In Electrical Workers
Local 1111 v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Bd., 315 U.S. 740 (1942), which con-
cerned the commerce power-based NLRA, Justice Douglas distinguished Hines as a case
in which "we were more willing to conclude that a federal Act in a field that touched
international relations superseded state regulation. . . ." Id. at 748-49. One obvious dif-
ference between the two bases of congressional power bears mention. The commerce power
tends to unite the nation and the states in relation to subject matter of internal relevance.
Statutes in exercise of the foreign affairs power necessarily include an additional factor-
the nation's external relations. Therefore, even though a matter within the federal foreign
affairs power affects a state's internal affairs, the federal interest is necessarily -greater
than in the commerce clause context because of the external relations factor. Later foreign
affairs cases indicate that the federal interest may be so strong as to preclude the balancing
of state interests altogether. See note 85 and accompanying text infra.
49. 312 U.S. at 67 (emphasis supplied).
50. Justice Black enumerated several factors to be considered in preemption cases:
"[t]he nature of the power exerted by Congress, the object sought to be obtained, and
the character of the obligations imposed by the law. . . ." Id. at 70. The first two were
hardly innovative, but the third entailed scrutiny of the statute's provisions with a view
toward an independent decision of how best to implement them.
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This activist judicial role enabled the Court to free itself from the con-
fines of earlier occupation and conflict analyses. Departing from the intentions
or purposes immediately inferable from the Alien Registration Act and its
legislative history, the Court substituted its own views on the desirability of the
conflicting statutes' coexistence. Justice Black imputed to the federal statute
the design of collecting information on aliens while simultaneously protecting
their individual liberties. He then concluded that the state statute might lead
to abuses of the latter purpose.51 The conflict thus deduced was a potential, if
not purely hypothetical, one. 2 In effect, the Court was engaging in policymak-
ing. The protection of individuals was in no way at the center of congressional
purposes,53 and even then, the conflict ground had to be expanded to encom-
pass potential conflicts to render it a preemptive ground.
Although the foreign affairs-civil liberties context gives Hines the charac-
ter of a limited, result-oriented decision, the Court subsequently extended the
doctrinal approach of Hines beyond its facts and constitutional foundation.
Hines led to a reformulation of the preemption doctrine and the principles
of federalism that undergird it. A scheme fundamentally irreconcilable with
the state-directed model of the 1930's decisions emerged as a competing ap-
proach, and the long period of uneasy coexistence between these two conflict-
ing frameworks has resulted in considerable doctrinal confusion and varia-
bility. 54 An examination of the developments traceable to Hines illustrates this
development.
2. The Intent Standard and Judicial Preemptive Authority. Although
Hines was a foreign affairs power case, and hence distinguishable from prior
and subsequent preemption cases involving commerce power-based legislation, 5
its principles influenced the intent standard applicable in occupation of the
field cases generally. The first indication that Hines' relaxed intent require-
ment applied outside the realm of foreign affairs appeared in Cloverleaf Butter
51. Id. at 74.
52. The finding of conflict in Hines suggests areas of vital federal interest may be
present even in the case of a non-pervasive federal regulation. See Hirsch, supra note 10,
at 532.
53. The Court relied primarily upon objections voiced against stricter requirements in
previous unsuccessful bills, and a statement of one of the 1940 Act's sponsors to the
effect that any controversial features of previous attempts had been omitted. 312 U.S. at
71-72 nn. 31-32. Note Chief justice Stone's criticism of this argument from the legislative
history. Id. at 80-81 (dissenting opinion).
54. This uneasy coexistence can be seen by comparing the doctrinal positions taken
in majority and dissenting opinion of the same case. See, e.g., Burbank v. Lockheed Air
Terminal, Inc., 411 U.S. 624 (1973) ; Farmers Educ. & Cooperative Union of America v.
WDAY, Inc., 360 U.S. 525 (1959); California v. Zook, 336 U.S. 725 (1949) ; Hines v.
Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52 (1941).
The contradictions extend to positions taken by the same Justice in different cases.
See note 221 in!ra. This, in turn, points to the result-orientation that characterizes the
Court's approach to preemption. See note 107 and accompanying text infra. The discussion
below will largely overlook this element and focus instead upon broader trends in the
development of the doctrine itself in the hope of ascertaining what independent force it has
had in the decisions.
55. See note 48 supra.
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Co. v. Patterson,0 where the Court invalidated a state regulation coming within
a federally regulated field but occupying an aspect untouched by the con-
gressional scheme. 57 Speaking of the doctrine generally, the Court said that a
"clear implication" of intent sufficed to accomplish preemption.58 With respect
to the federal statute before it, the Court found an expansive preemptive
scope: once the federal government has taken the regulation of a substantial
industry in hand, isolated state-based additions were impermissible. 59
In Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp.60 the Court sought to flesh out the
vague contours of the intent standard articulated in Cloverleaf.6 The intent
factors enumerated in Rice 2 incorporated the considerations decisive in Hines
and Cloverleaf: pervasive regulation, dominant federal interest and unham-
pered operation. Although these factors appear to comprise a comprehensive
"test" for occupation of the field, they have applied in such a manner only
once.0 3 Rather, they have been invoked on an ad hoc basis to justify particular
preemptive decisions.
64
56. 315 U.S. 148 (1942).
57. Section 2325 of the Internal Revenue Code provided for the inspection of renovated
butter factories. An Alabama statute required inspection of the product's principal con-
stituent, packing stock butter. In addition, the state law authorized confiscation of non-
conforming packing stock butter, whereas the Secretary of Agriculture possessed no
parallel authority in the federal regulatory scheme. This latter state provision spurred
the litigation.
Although the federal statute at issue in the case was grounded in the taxing power,
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1, the Court viewed its regulatory features to be based on the
commerce clause. 315 U.S. at 163.
58. Id. at 157.
59. Id. at 167-68.
It should be noted that although the Court stated Cloverleaf's issue in conflict terms,
id. at 168-69, the analysis upon which the result was founded bears a closer relation to
occupation of the field. For example, the Court reasoned:
Since there was federal regulation of the materials and composition of the manu-
factured article, there could not be similar state regulation of the same subject.
Id. at 169 (emphasis supplied).
60. 331 U.S. 218 (1947).
61. Because the Rice Court found a specific congressional intent to preempt con-
current state regulation, its discussion of the broadened intent standard was dictum. The
Court's willingness to gratuitously clarify Cloverleaf confirmed the demise of the state-
directed preemption doctrine.
62. See text accompanying note 15 supra.
63. See Pennsylvania v. Nelson, 350 U.S. 497 (1956), where the Court held that the
federal prohibition in the Smith Act of 1940, 18 U.S.C. § 2385 (1970), of knowing advocacy
of the overthrow of the government of the United States by force and violence preempted
state prohibition of the same conduct. The Court emphasized the federal statute's per-
vasiveness, the national proportions of the sedition problem and administrative difficulties
attending concurrent 'prohibitions. Id. at 502-07.
The decision elicited a strongly negative response. See C. McGOWAN, supra note 8.
at 48. Because forty-two states had similar provisions, a bill was proposed in Congress
to limit federal preemption, in the absence of explicit congressional directives, to fields
involving exclusive federal power. See J. SCHMIDHAUSER, THE SUPREME COURT AS FINAL
ARBITER IN FEDERAL-STATE RELATIONS, 1789-1957, at 191 (1958).
Perhaps in response to the furor, the Court defused the issue in Uphaus v. Wyman,
360 U.S. 72 (1959), by holding that Nelson did not prohibit states from prosecuting
seditious conduct directed against them.
64. The pervasive nature of federal labor legislation has persuaded the Court to pre-
empt state law. See, e.g., Teamsters Local 20 v. Morton, 377 U.S. 252 (1964) ; Teamsters
Local 174 v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95 (1961). Federal regulation of air commerce has
produced the same result. See Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal, Inc., 411 U.S. 624
1975]
COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW[l
Although bearing only a tenuous relation to the traditional notion of
congressional intent, the Rice factors do manifest one eminently practical con-
clusion. Congressional intent, strictly defined as it had been, is an inadequate
source for the decision of preemption questions. Preoccupied with the business
of legislating, Congress turns its sights inward to the formulation of its own
policies, and does not, as a rule, anticipate ramifications with respect to state
law.6 5 To draw the negative inference from congressional silence-intent not
to occupy a field-necessarily leads to a result in the state's favor, which may
not be the most desirable one considering the totality of circumstances attend-
ing the operation of a federal regulatory scheme.
By discounting intent as an absolute limitation on the permissible sources
of preemptive findings, Hines and Rice expanded the judicial role in occupa-
tion-of-the-field cases. This development inevitably resulted in more findings
of preemption than during the period of ascendancy of the state-directed doc-
trine. 6
While the Court often expressly or implicitly relied on Hines' consti-
tutional imperative67 or the Rice factors 8 to justify preemption, the activist era
witnessed the birth of additional preemptive bases premised on considerations
.of extrastatutory policies which the Court imputed to Congress. In Farmers
Educational & Cooperative Union of America v. WDA Y, Inc.,D for example,
the Court held that provisions of the Federal Communications Act 70 prohibit-
ing censorship of political broadcasts clothed broadcasters with immunity from
state libel laws. Although intent to occupy the field could not be readily in-
ferred from the Act's scrambled legislative history, and a finding of conflict
proved similarly elusive, considerations of fairness to broadcasters persuaded
the Court to preempt state law.7 1 The most consistent and extensive resort to
policy rationales occurred in the labor law cases-San Diego Building Trade
(1973) ; but see Colorado Anti-Discrimination Comm'n v. Continental Air Lines, Inc.,
372 U.S. 714, 722-25 (1963) (federal aviation statute's ban on racial discrimination in
hiring held not to preempt similar state provisions in the absence of further evidence of
either intent or frustration of purpose).
65. See Comment, supra note 26, at 209. See also Hirsch, supra note 10, at 542-43.
On occasion, however, Congress has expressly excluded or permitted state regulation.
See, e.g., 7 U.S.C. § 269 (1970) (exclusive federal jurisdiction over licensed warehouses) ;
15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-15 (1970) (with stated exceptions, no act of Congress shall "be con-
strued to invalidate, impair, or supersede" any state law regulating insurance).
66. Cf. G. GUNTHER & N. DOWLING, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW 673 (8th ed. 1970). See generally the statistical compilation of decisions in R.
ROETTINGER, THE SUPREME COURT AND STATE POLICE POWER: A STUDY IN FEDERALISMf
195-206 (1957).
67. See, e.g., Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971), and Kolovrat v. Oregon,
366 U.S. 187 (1961) (foreign affairs); Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Steffel Co., 376 U.S.
225 (1964), and Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc., 376 U.S. 234 (1964) (patents),
68. See text accompanying note 15 supra.
69. 360 U.S. 525 (1959).
70. 47 U.S.C. § 315(a) (1970).
71. 360 U.S. at 531-35.
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Council v. Garninon,72 its immediate predecessors 73 and its progeny.74 In these
cases, a judicially perceived need to leave to the National Labor Relations
Board the adjudicative development of the law controlling labor relations has
resulted in extensive preemption of legislative and judicial state action in the
field.
Although the Court purportedly abided by congressional intent in these
cases, 75 its occasional references to "congressional design" 76 to occupy the
field suggest that these efforts were strained at best. 77 The fact of congressional
action alone rendered federal law presumptively preemptive.78 The change
occurred when the Court in deciding preemption cases departed from the terms
72. 359 U.S. 236 (1959). The Garnion rule, that both state and federal courts must
defer to the exclusive competence of the NLRB "[w]hen an activity is arguably subject to
§ 7 or § 8 of the [NLRA]," was formulated to avert the danger of state interference
with national policy. Id. at 245. The policy enunciated by the Court stressed the avoidance
of conflict both between federal and state law enforcement authorities and between in-
consistent standards of substantive law, id. at 242, with particular emphasis placed upon
protecting the unifying role of the centralized administrative agency, id. at 241-43.
73. For example, despite identity between Pennsylvania labor law and the NLRA,
judicial concern for the uniformity of substantive and procedural law controlling labor
relations preempted the state's jurisdiction over an unfair labor practice in Garner v.
Teamsters Local 776, 346 U.S. 485, 490-91 (1953).
74. In Amalgamated Ass'n of St., Elec. Ry. & Motor Coach Employees v. Lockridge,
403 U.S. 274 (1971), the Court restated the policies supporting preemption of state juris-
diction over labor relations. It again stressed the development of uniform substantive law
through action by a single agency. Id. at 288-89. Significantly, it defended Garmon by
emphasizing the necessity of formulating a general rule to govern adjudication in an area
for which Congress itself has not determined the extent of state law's displacement. Id.
at 289.
Other notable applications of the Garmon rule include Longshoreman's Local 1416 v.
Ariadne Shipping Co., 397 U.S. 195 (1970); Teamsters Local 20 v. Morton, 377 U.S.
252 (1964); Marine Eng'rs Beneficial Ass'n v. Interlake Steamship Co., 370 U.S. 173
(1962). See generally Cox, Labor Law Preemption Revisited, 85 HARV. L. REv. 1337
(1972) ; Lesnick, Preemption Reconsidered: The Apparent Reaffirmation of Garmon, 72
COLUm. L. REV. 469 (1972).
In recognition of overriding state interests, the Court has carved out a few exceptions
to the Garmon rule. See Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 180-82 (1967) (union duty of fair
representation regarded as touching deeply rooted local interests of only peripheral concern
to federal labor law) ; Linn v. Plant Guard Workers Local 114, 383 U.S. 53, 57, 61 (1966)
(state responsibility to protect its citizens from the injury of defamation accommodated
with federal interest in uniform regulation of labor relations) ; Smith v. Evening News
Ass'n, 371 U.S. 195, 197 (1962) (NLRB does not have exclusive jurisdiction over viola-
tions of provisions in collective bargaining agreements).
If the exceptions are read together with the rule, the labor field can be seen as falling
under an overall division between subjects requiring uniform national treatment through
the NLRB, and permitting local regulation. In effect, the Court has sought to achieve an
overall balance of federal and state interests with regard to a subject matter which is
deemed to trigger the federal presumption.
75. See, e.g., Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 179 (1967); Teamsters Local 174 v.
Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95, 104 (1961).
76. Head v. New Mexico Bd. of Examiners, 374 'U.S. 424, 430 (1963), quoting
Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 141 (1963).
77. It has been suggested that the Court draws the line between the federation and
the states where it thinks it wise without significant regard to congressional intent. The
Court's reaction to the state legislation's desirability possesses greater influence than the"metaphorical sign-language of 'occupation of the field.'" See Crampton, Pennsylvania v.
Nelson: A Case Study in Federal Pre-emption, 26 U. CxI L. Rxv. 85, 87 (1958). See also
Powell, Supreme Court Decisions on the Commerce Clause and the State Police Power,
1910-1914, pt. II, 22 CoLum. L. REV. 28, 48 (1922).
78. See also Hirsch, supra note 10, at 549.
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of the statutes and legislative histories, to add inferences drawn from other
sources, and to independently articulate policies based upon the resulting ag-
gregate of factors. Ruminating in Garmon on the meaninglessness of an intent
standard in the labor context, Justice Frankfurter aptly explained the reason
for its abandonment:
Many of these problems probably could not have been, at all events
were not, foreseen by Congress. Others were only dimly perceived and
their precise scope only vaguely defined. This Court was called upon
to apply a new and complicated legislative scheme, the aims and so-
cial policy of which were drawn with broad strokes while the details
had to be filled in, to no small extent, by the judicial process.
0
3. The Emergence of a Potential Conflict Standard. Although the Hines-
Rice line of cases had its greatest impact on occupation-of-the-field decisions,
it also influenced the law in conflict cases. Whereas the Court had previously
restricted the preemptive reach of the conflict ground to state laws in actual
conflict with federal regulatory schemes,80 on several occasions subsequent to
Hines and Rice it voided state law by perceiving a potential conflict with fed-
eral legislation. In Pennsylvania v. Nelson,81 a case involving concurrent anti-
sedition laws, the Court relied in part upon the possibility of incompatible ad-
judications resulting from multiple tribunals and diverse procedures to pre-
empt state law.82 The potential conflict ground has also figured prominently in
a number of labor preemption cases.
8 3
The adoption of a potential conflict standard accented the drift toward a
federal-directed preemption doctrine, by beckoning judicial consideration of a
federal statute's operational requirement and inviting preemption on specula-
tive assessments of conflict.
4. The Federal Presumption and Absolute Supremacy: An Overview.
Even before the state presumption lost its force generally, concepts certain to
undermine it appeared in Hines and Rice. Rice, for example, drew a sweeping
correlation between a statute's pervasiveness and the likelihood of occupation
of the field. By factoring out intent, this aspect of Rice attached inherent pre-
emptive capability to the federal statute itself. Attaching decisive preemptive
effect to the solitary fact of congressional action bears comparison with pre-
1930's preemption decisions.8 4 This newly rediscovered preemptive capability,
79. 359 U.S. at 240.
80. See text accompanying notes 25 and 27-28 supra.
81. 350 U.S. 497 (1956) ; see note 63 supra.
82. Id. at 509.
83. In San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236 (1959), for example,
Justice Frankfurter rejected state regulation of activities falling under sections 7 and 8
of the NLRA, 29 U.S.C. §§ 157-158 (1970), in part because the resulting danger of
federal-state conflict would create a "potential frustration of national purposes." Id. at 244;
see also Smith v. Evening News Ass'n, 371 U.S. 195, 202-03 (1962) (Black, J., dissenting);
Garner v. Teamsters Local 776, 346 U.S. 485, 490-91 (1953).
84. See Comment, Goldstein v. California, Breaking Up Federal Copyright Preenp-
tion, 74 Cottrm. L. Rzv. 960, 967 (1974) ; note 24 supra.
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the concomitant lowering of the intent barrier and the Court's increasingly solic-
itous spirit with respect to federal interests combined to break down the
state presumption and facilitate the erection of a federal replacement.
The cases demonstrate the mechanics of the process. Hines, once again,
provides a point of departure. There, the national interest embedded in the
foreign affairs power generated the strongest possible presumption in favor
of preemption, short of an outright declaration of constitutionally mandated
exclusivity.8 5 Like Hines, succeeding cases under tjie aegis of foreign affairs,
8 6
brushed over the intent barrier and preempted state regulation on the strength
of the federal presumption. Read together, their recognition of a strong fed-
eral interest not only overpowers, but seems to foreclose any recognition of
corresponding state interests.
The exceptional constitutional backing of the foreign affairs power per-
mitted a federal presumption to operate without necessarily impugning the
state's presumption's general validity8 7 But the Court, more ignoring than
rejecting the state presumption, raised the federal one in fields lacking foreign
affairs' constitutional imperative."" The extension did not go unprotested.
Dissenting in Pennsylvania v. Nelson,8 9 Justice Reed called the finding of a
compelling national interest in sedition an application of Hines bereft of its
constitutional basis. 0 But the protest came too late. By 1956, when Nelson
was decided, Hines' substantive approach was well along the way toward
general applicability.91
Undoubtedly, the development of the federal presumption can be ascribed
Professor Engdahl, on the other hand, has argued that a sharp break occurred in the
1930's from a theory of incompatible concurrent power to an intent-dominated inquiry.
Engdahl, supra note 5, at 52-55. But the Court's subsequent return to a more vigorous
conception of the preemptive power of federal law has made the intent requirement a
nominal one, resulting in a federal-directed doctrine which is remarkably similar to the pre-
1930's approach.
85. In the later cases, the Court continued to imply an independent constitutional
basis. See note 86 infra. The Court altogether left behind the statutory base in Zschernig
v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429 (1968), where it struck down a state restriction on foreign heirs'
right to take under its intestate succession laws not because of any conflict with policy
derived from treaties but as a state intrusion into foreign affairs in general. Id. at 432,
441. See The Supreme Court, 1967 Term, 82 HARV. L. Rav. 63, 238-45 (1968).
86. See Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971) ; Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S.
429 (1968) ; Kolovat v. Oregon, 366 U.S. 187 (1961) ; United States v. Pink, 315 U.S.
203 (1942).
87. State interests also passed largely unconsidered in two patent cases for which a
constitutional imperative-the copyright clause-analogous to that of the foreign affairs
power can be hypothesized. Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225 (1964);
Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc., 376 U.S. 234 (1964); see note 123 infra.
88. See, e.g., Townsend v. Swank, 404 U.S. 282 (1971) (welfare grants in aid);
Free v. Bland, 369 U.S. 663 (1962) (treasury regulations) ; Farmers Educ. & Cooperative
Union of America v. WDAY, Inc., 360 U.S. 525 (1959) (communications regulation).
In Cloverleaf Butter Co. v. Patterson, 315 U.S. 148, 169 (1942), the Court implied that
even where state law neither conflicts nor coincides, the pervasiveness of the statutory
scheme may be preemptive of all state regulation. See notes 56-59 and accompanying text
supra.
89. 350 U.S. 497 (1956).
90. Id. at 515-16.
91. See note 88 stpra.
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in part to the Court's implicit assumption of independent preemptive authority.
The accompanying relaxation of the intent standard permitted recognition of,
and action upon, federal interests formerly unreachable in the absence of clear
congressional expression. But the federal presumption acquired a force of its
own. In the labor cases, for example, it took shape in the idea that the scheme
of federal statutes regulating labor relations had achieved a balance between
the competing interests of unions, management, employees and the public,
which would be endangered by any entry of state law into the field.0 2 To
rebut the federal presumption and vindicate state interests, the Court required
an affirmative congressional indication of tolerance of concurrent state regula-
tion.93
No less than with the rigidly applied state-directed formulation, how-
ever, preemption under the federal presumption tended to prevent a flexible
response to interrelated federal and state interests. The difficulty was aggra-
vated in conflict cases, where the very existence of the federal statute raises a
claim of exclusivity under the supremacy clause. Thus, when the issue of bal-
ancing federal and state interests in the face of an actual conflict arose during
this period, the Court rejected the notion of flexible supremacy introduced in
Huron and Kesler.94 Chief Justice Warren reestablished the absolute su-
premacy principle in Free v. Bland:95
The relative importance to the State of its own law is not material
when there is a conflict with a valid federal law, for the Framers of
our Constitution provided that the federal law must prevail.90
In Perez v. Campbell,97 the Court specifically overruled Kesler, rejecting its
"aberrational doctrine . . . that state law may frustrate the operation of
federal law as long as the state legislature in passing its law had some purpose
in mind other than one of'frustration."98 The case forcefully reaffirmed the
Hines rule-the supremacy clause invalidates any frustration of federal law's
full effectiveness. 99
The Court's recognition of the principle of absolute supremacy owes much
to its desire to meet needs perceived in the subject matter at hand. Whether
in labor law,100 communications,' 0' civil liberties,10 2 civil rights,10 3 welfare
92. See Cox, The Supreme Court and the Federal System, 50 CALIF. L. Rv. 800,
809 (1962) ; cf. Teamsters Local 174 v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95, 104 (1961).
93. See, e.g., Amalgamated Ass'n of St., Elec. Ry. & Motor Coach Employees v.
Lockridge, 403 U.S. 274, 297 (1971).
94. See notes 35-39 and accompanying text supra.
95. 369 U.S. 663 (1962).
96. Id. at 666.
97. 402 U.S. 637 (1971).
98. 402 U.S. at 651-52.
99. Id. at 652.
100. See notes 71-73, 83 and accompanying text supra.
101. See Farmers Educ. & Cooperative Union of America v. WDAY, Inc., 360 U.S.
525 (1959), discussed at notes 70-71 and accompanying text supra.
102. Cf. Pennsylvania v. Nelson, 350 U.S. 497 (1956), discussed at note 63, and
text accompanying notes 81-82 supra; Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52 (1941), discussed
at notes 41-53 and accompanying text supra.
103. See, e.g., Ham v. Rock Hill, 379 U.S. 306 (1964).
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entitlement,1' 4 foreign affairs, 0 5 or criminal law, 0 6 the Court's invocation of
the federal presumption finds justification in the merits of the individual
cases.'0 7 But the Court's result orientation tended to rigidify into a reflexive
protection of federal interests with little regard for countervailing state con-
cerns. By its very nature, this aggressive mode of assessing the preemptive
capacity of federal law came to impair a genuine balancing of state and federal
interests.
II. BURGER COURT DEVELOPMENTS
In 1973, just as the federal presumption had acquired the veneer of
doctrinal permanence, the Court abruptly began to change direction. In a series
of decisions-Goldstein v. California,0  New York State Department of So-
cial Services v. Dublino,109 Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp.",° and Merrill
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Ware"-the Court once again in-
corporated a solicitude of state interests into its preemption inquiry.
A. The Constitutional Issue in Goldstein v. California and the Court's Re-
sponse to State Interests
In Goldstein v. California1 2 Chief justice Burger, writing- for a five-to-
four majority, aggressively protected the states' right to prohibit the repro-
duction of phonograph records from misappropriated copies by narrowly
construing the preemptive scope of the copyright clause."13 In affirming peti-
tioner's conviction under a California statute making record piracy a criminal
104. See, e.g., Carleson v. Remillard, 406 U.S. 598 (1972) ; Townsend v. Swank, 404
U.S. 282 (1971).
105. See notes 85-86 and accompanying text supra.
106. See, e.g., Ham v. Rock Hill, 379 U.S. 306 (1964); California v. Zook, 336 U.S.
725 (1949), discussed at note 34 supra.
107. To some extent, the rise of the federal presumption may be correlated with
congressional entry into nontraditional subject matter areas, where the Court may have
felt a greater solicitude of federal interests than in the traditional commerce power areas.
But the correlation is far from perfect. Thus, although some relatively recent cases con-
cerning more traditional commerce clause topics, see, e.g., Florida Lime & Avocado
Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132 (1963) (interstate flow of produce) and Huron
Portland Cement Co. v. City of Detroit, 362 U.S. 440 (1960) (licensing of interstate
shipping), have state-directed results, a countervailing number involved preemption on
expansive assessments of federal policies, see, e.g., Campbell v. Hussey, 368 U.S. 297, 302
(1961) (classification of commodities) ; Castle v. Hayes Freight Lines, Inc., 348 U.S. 61,
63-64 (1954) (federal licensing of interstate trucking).
The tension lies not between the doctrine and tight compartments of subject matter,
but between the doctrine and the Justices' reactions to the merits of the individual case.
While the Court is never explicit as to the point where the doctrine impresses itself
upon the facts, or the facts upon the doctrine, the Court's reliance on presumptions embody
perspectives of federalism that tend to influence its approach to the cases' merits. The
phenomenon becomes apparent, not in the isolated case, but in aggregates of cases decided
over long periods.
108. 412 U.S. 546 (1973).
109. 413 U.S. 405 (1973).
110. 416 U.S. 470 (1974).
111. 414 U.S. 117 (1973).
112. 412 U.S. 546 (1973). For more extensive discussions of the case see generally
Comment, supra note 84.
113. U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
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offense, the Court considered but rejected the constitutional claim that the
federal copyright power by its own force, notwithstanding the absence of
any federal regulation of the matter, precluded concurrent state legislation.
114
The copyright clause question, although strictly speaking not one of pre-
emption," 5 nonetheless merits examination, for the Court in Goldstein utilized
the analytical tools of the preemption doctrine and its resolution bears broader
implications for the present Court's approach to federal-state relations. On
this threshold issue, the Court narrowly construed the preemptive capability of
the copyright clause by holding the federal copyright power to be exclusive
only when a similar exercise by the states would be "absolutely and totally
contradictory and repugnant."" 0 Relying on early commerce clause prece-
dents" 7 which distinguished national, preemptive subject matter from subject
matter essentially local in character, and hence nonpreemptive, 118 the Court
fashioned a test for ascertaining "repugnancy": exclusive federal power exists
over "matters which are necessarily national in import.""'" Moreover, even
with respect to "necessarily national" matters, permissible situations in which
conflicts from concurrent federal and state regulation "may possibly arise"
must be distinguished from impermissible situations, mandating preemption, in
which such conflicts "will necessarily" arise.
120
In place of this commerce clause analysis, the Court could have analo-
gized from the foreign affairs model of Hines to accord the constitutionally
based federal copyright power a preemptive capacity amounting to federal ex-
clusivity even in the absence of congressional action. 121 In contrast to the nebu-
lous commerce power grant, the "specific" character 122 of the copyright power
invites an analogy to the relatively circumscribed subject matter of foreign
affairs.123 Chief Justice Burger, however, declined to draw the analogy.
114. 412 U.S. at 548.
115. The statutory preemption issue in Goldstein is discussed at notes 128-136 and
accompanying text infra.
116. 412 U.S. at 553. The Court's use of the "repugnancy" standard for determining
the preemptive force of the copyright clauses tracks Alexander Hamilton's analysis in
THE FEDERALIST No. 32, at 200 (Van Doren ed. 1945) ; see text accompanying note 41
supra.
117. See Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299 (1851); Gibbons v.
Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
118. 412 U.S. at 553.
119. Id. at 554 (emphasis in original). The "necessity" element derives from Gibbons
v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 195 (1824).
120. 412 U.S. at 554.
121. See notes 48, 67 and 85 and accompanying text supra.
122. See Comment, supra note 84, at 966.
123. The Court appears to have seized upon this analogy in Sears, Roebuck & Co.
v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225 (1964), and Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc., 376
U.S. 234 (1964). The two cases held that when an article is unprotected by a patent or
copyright, state unfair competition law may not forbid copying. To allow the prohibition
would interfere with federal policy grounded in the copyright clause and implementing
federal legislation in favor of competition outside the time-limited federal patent and
copyright monopolies. Id. at 237. Since the federal patent statute clearly did not reach
unpatentable articles, see Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., supra at 226, 230-31; text
accompanying note 131 infra, the Court may have been drawing its policy inferences from
the copyright clause itself.
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In enunciating a "repugnancy" standard, the Court favored a flexible
conception of federal-state relations rather than one of absolute federal su-
premacy. Since the local-national distinction embodied in commerce clause
principles restrained the preemptive scope of federal power and permitted ex-
tensive concurrent jurisdiction,'1 24 the requirements of effective copyright
regulation could be balanced against the competing demands of the states for
recognition of their interests in local regulation.
The Court, however, went beyond merely articulating a flexible pre-
emption test. By adding a strongly state-directed standard for measuring
"repugnancy"-the requirement of "necessarily national" character and "neces-
sary" conflict-the Court erected a bar with an impact analogous to that of
the specific intent to preempt requirement.
To decide the constitutional permissibility of state protection of record-
ings from piracy, the Court measured the regulated subject matter against its
newly formulated standard. Given the standard's strictness, the majority
evidently felt no need to detail its argument that because of the "enormous
diversity" of the American people's "backgrounds, origins and interests" from
region to region, the subject matter to which the copyright clause is addressed
may be of local importance. 1 25 Remaining difficulties-possible prejudice to
one state's interests due to the actions of another, or possible conflict with
federal authority-fell away under the "necessary" conflict requirement.
126
Considering the nature of the modern communications industry, however,
the viability of local copyright regulation is doubtful. The promotion, distri-
bution and marketing of sound recordings can hardly be deemed an "intrastate"
activity. If the "necessarily national" character leg of the Court's test is to
have any practical applicability, recordings should have come within it. The
Court therefore seems to have extended protection to questionable state inter-
ests and in the process ignored potential federal interests in uniform regula-
tion of a subject matter which does not admit of local treatment.
The Court's state-directed standard for federal exclusivity and its prob-
lematic treatment of the subject matter of sound recordings may best be ex-
plained by the Court's unwillingness to find in the Constitution a directive
preventing the states from regulating in an area wholly ignored by Congress.
127
Goldstein posed a choice between providing blanket protection against all
contingencies likely to obstruct the potential exercise of federal power, or
124. See, e.g., Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 143-45
(1963). See generally note 18 supra. For a suggestion that the commerce clause analogy
is a long-standing one, see 19 VILL. L. Rv. 496, 497 (1974).
125. 412 U.S. at 557-58. The Court's use of the local-national test for copyright has
been criticized. Nimmer contends that the diversity of taste and interest in works of
authorship in the nation rests on more subtle factors, such as age and education, that are
not distinguishable by geographic reason. 1 M. NImmER, NIMMER oN COPYRIGHT § 1.1,
at 1 (1963) ; see also 15 B.C. IND. & Comr. L. REv. 636, 640 (1974).
126. 412 U.S. at 558-59.
127. See notes 132-133 and accompanying text infra.
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encouraging state regulation subject to correction by congressional interven-
tion in the field. By choosing the latter course, the Court essentially rejected
the federal presumption in order to give recognition to declared state interests
in the absence of any congressional declaration of federal concern.
Goldstein marks the reemergence of a state presumption. The Court
has begun to apply the state-directed view of federalism embodied in Gold-
stein's determination of the copyright clause's preemptive capability to the
statutory context.
B. The Occupation Ground
1. Return to the State Presumption. In denying the constitutional exclu-
sivity of the federal copyright power, Goldstein addressed a question only
preliminary to the preemption inquiry. There remained to be resolved the
traditional preemption question-whether California's penal statute was in-
compatible with the federal legislative scheme.
Examining the statutory issue, the Court first excluded recordings from
the "writings" category of the Act of 1909,128 and then distinguished Sears,
Roebuck & Co. v'. Stiffel Co. 1 29 and Cornpco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting,
Inc.,"' ° which nullified state unfair competition laws protecting federally
unpatentable articles, as involving an undisturbable congressional balance be-
tween innovation within patentable areas and competition outside of them.13
As the technological modernity of record piracy precluded not only intent
to preempt but any sort of coverage in the 1909 Act, the Court found the field
to be unattended. 132 It then held the congressional silence to have left the field
open to state regulation.
33
The holding implicitly relies upon the state presumption. In dealing with
congressional silence, the Court might have followed Sears and Cornpco and
invoked the federal presumption. 3 4 Those cases had stated a policy favoring
competition in the absence of specific congressional instruction, and would
have required an affirmative showing of congressional permission for state
regulation inconsistent with free competition. 35 The policy underlying the
Sears-Compco federal presumption was not, however, a mere inference from
but an elaboration upon tile statutes, grounded in judicial preemptive author-
ity. By appearing to reimpose the clear intent standard, the Court thus indi-
128. 17 U.S.C. § 4 (1970).
129. 376 U.S. 225 (1964).
130. 376 U.S. 234 (1964).
131. 412 U.S. at 569. For a fuller analysis of the Goldstein Court's treatment of
Sears and Coipeo, compare Comment, supra note 184, at 973-76 with 19 VILL. L. REv.
496 (1974).
132. Legislation effective after the events of Goldstein has extended federal copyright
protection to recordings. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 1(f), 5(n) (Supp. II, 1972).
133. 412 U.S. at 571.
134. See, id. at 574 (Douglas, J., dissenting) ; id. at 578 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
See also note 123 supra.
135. Id. at 578 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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cated a disinclination to maintain a preemptive policymaking role in the
copyright area. 136
The favorable disposition toward state interests that undergirded both the
constitutional and statutory holdings of Goldstein similarly led to a departure
from precedents in the welfare field in New York State Department of Social
Services v. Dublino.137 The issue was whether the Work Incentive Program
(WIN) of the Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) section of
the Social Security Act 38 preempted the New York Work Rules 39 require-
ment that individuals accept employment as a condition to receipt of federal
AFDC assistance.140 New York's rules, promulgated pursuant to its par-
ticipation in the AFDC grants-in-aid program, terminated payments more
summarily and at an earlier stage' 4' than the WIN guidelines. 142 The
Court held that WIN did not occupy the field,' 43 but remanded 144 on the issue
of whether the Work Rules' termination penalty conflicted with the AFDC
requirement that aid be furnished "with reasonable promptness to all eligible
individuals.'
45
In sustaining the Work Rules, the Court affirmed the state's legitimate
interest in promoting self-reliance and assuring "that limited state welfare
funds be spent on behalf of those genuinely incapacitated and most in need.
. .,"146 To build this state interest into a presumption against preemption, the
Court relied upon the principle of cooperative federalism embodied in grants-
in-aid programs like AFDC.14 7 It accordingly concerned itself less with pro-
tecting the inviolability of the federal scheme than with preventing the poten-
tial impairment of the state's ability to handle its citizens' increasing depen-
dency and mounting welfare costs and presumably to participate in the AFDC
program. 48 Emphasizing New York's effort to administer its welfare program
136. A comparable treatment of congressional silence in Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron
Corp., 416 U.S. 470 (1974), sustained state trade secret law as against the copyright
clause and federal patent law. See notes 175-180 and accompanying text infra.
137. 413 U.S. 405 (1973).
138. 42 U.S.C. §§ 630-44 (1970).
139. N.Y. Soc. SERvicrs LAW § 131 (McKinney Supp. 1974).
140. 413 U.S. at 406-07.
141. The Work Rules require employable welfare recipients to pick up their checks
in person, certify the unavailability of employment, and report for public works employ-
ment, job interviews, and any employment obtained therefrom. N.Y. Soc. SERVICEs LAW
§ 131 (McKinney Supp. 1974). Failure to comply with these requirements is deemed
a refusal of aid and results in termination. Id. § 131(4) (a).
142. While having the same purpose of promoting self-sufficiency among welfare re-
cipients, 413 U.S. at 409-10, WIN's periodic certification requirements, see 42 U.S.C.
§ 602(a) (8) (1970), are less strict than the Work Rules; and the federal program both
omits the termination penalty, see id. § 602(a) (8), and incorporates extensive procedural
safeguards, see id. §§ 602(a) (4), 602(a) (19) (F), 633(g), not present in the state scheme.
143. 413 U.S. at 422.
144. 413 U.S. at 422-23.
145. 42 U.S.C. § 602(a) (19) (1970).
146. 413 U.S. at 413.
147. The Court pointed out that because the Work Rules were implemented as part
of AFDC and WIN, the case did not involve the usual preemption pattern of independent
federal and state statutes converging on common subject matter. Id. at 414 n.9.
148. Id. at 413.
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free from friction with WIN, the Court then fashioned a presumption against
preemption:
Where co-ordinate state and federal efforts exist within a comple-
mentary administrative framework, and in the pursuit of common
purposes, the case for federal preemption becomes a less persuasive
one.
1 49
Having placed the burden of demonstrating incompatability on the chal-
lengers to the Work Rules, the Court summarily found them not to have met
it. 15 0
As in Goldstein, the Court's single-minded emphasis on state interests in
Dublino can be questioned. Only the state's AFDC recipients would have been
affected by extending the WIN provisions in place of the Work Rules. More-
over, job placements both under WIN and the Work Rules have been negli-
gible,151 suggesting that it is unlikely that the state's interest in efficient,
solvent welfare administration would have been sacrificed by such extension.
In effect, the Court accorded to this minor impairment of New York's scheme
greater weight than both the federal government's interest in tie integrity of
the conditions attached to its expenditures, and the congressional purpose to
preserve the family unit through aid.152 As with Goldstein's constitutional dis-
cussion, Dublino went some distance to secure a state interest, and in the
process may have ignored countervailing federal interests.!Y
3
Dublino cannot be squared completely with the precedents it failed in
terms to overrule. In Townsend v. Swank' 54 the Court had established a general
rule for preempting differing terms of state implementations of the AFDC
program. Absent "clearly evidenced" congressional authority to exclude indi-
viduals otherwise eligible for aid under the federal statute, exclusionary state
149. Id. at 421.
150. The Court dismissed the challengers' argument as based in a legislative history
too "fragmentary" to evidence congressional intention to supersede state work programs.
Id. at 415-16.
151. In New York, from January to June, 1972, there were 2,657 job placements
under WIN and 5,323 under the Work Rules (including those not receiving AFDC
assistance). Id. at 420 n.5.
152. 413 U.S. at 423, 427-28 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
153. The Court's renewed emphasis on state interests and underestimation of federal
interests is further illustrated by a recent decision in the well entrenched federal subject
matter of labor relations. In NLRB v. Boeing Co., 412 U.S. 67 (1973), the Court held
that the reasonableness of disciplinary fines imposed by unions on their members was not
a matter for NLRB unfair labor practice determination but was a question.to be left
entirely to state courts. Id. at 75.
While not strictly a preemption case, Boeing accomplishes a form of "reverse pre-
emption," Craver, The Boeing Decision: A Blow to Federalism, Individual Rihits and
Stare Decisis, 122 U. PA. L. REv. 556, 593 (1974), by foreclosing NLRB jurisdiction,
The Court rejected the well-settled grounds of labor preemption: the need for national
uniformity of decisions and the expertise of the NLRB. Id. at 76-77. It thereby commenced
to erode the preemptive policy underlying the Garmon rule. See notes 72-73 and accom-
panying text supra. Here also the Court protected state interests, while minimizing the
importance of justifiable and previously decisive federal interests in uniformity and expert
agency control over the development of the law.
154. 404 U.S. 282 (1971).
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provisions were invalid.155 State discretion extended only to the level of
benefits and the standard of need.156 Dissenting in Dublino, Justice Marshall
contended that the additional conditions of the Work Rules constituted an
exclusion within the Swank rule, and therefore required an affirmative show-
ing of congressional intent to be sustained.1 57 The majority, however, dis-
tinguished the state regulations involved in Swank and like-holding cases
58
as lacking the Work Rules' support in the congressional legislative history." 9
The legislative history supporting the state in Dublino, however, was little
more compelling than that in preceding cases.160 As between Sears-Compco
and Goldstein, the points of distinction between Dublino and its predecessors
are negligible. In essence, the Court has switched the burden of proof to the
federal side, and has reinterpreted congressional silence in the state's favor.
2. The Doctrine Restated. Dublino more than paralleled Goldstein.
What the Court in Goldstein merely implied as to the requirement of specific
congressional intent for occupation and its predisposition toward a state pre-
sumption, it made explicit in Dublino. The Court's drift back to the state
presumption was unmistakably discernible in its revival of a moribund, some-
what extreme statement of the state-directed formula:
If Congress is authorized to act in a field, it should manifest its inten-
tion clearly. It will not be presumed that a federal statute was intended
to supersede the exercise of the power of the state unless there is a
clear manifestation of intention to do so. The exercise of federal
supremacy is not lightly to be presumed.161
Dublino's test for occupation of the field is tantamount to a specific intent
requirement. The Court noted that because twenty-one states had AFDC pro-
grams at the time of WIN's enactment, any intention to supersede existing
work rules "would in all likelihood have been expressed in direct and unam-
biguous language."' 62 For possibly the first time in a preemption case, the
Court in effect implemented the hoary maxim of construction: that had the
legislature intended the result requested, it explicitly would have provided for
it. Although the precise contours of the test are in doubt, Dublino has resur-
rected the strictly construed intent requirement that obtained during the as-
cendancy of the state-directed approach.163 Dublino's intent standard implicitly
155. Id. at 286.
156. Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U.S. 535 (1972) ; Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S.
471 (1970) ; King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309, 318-19 (1968).
157. 413 U.S. at 423-24.
158. See Carleson v. Remillard, 406 U.S. 598 (1972) ; King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309
(1968).
159. 413 U.S. at 421-22. The Court relied on the limited number of recipients accom-
modated by WIN, and HEW's policy of approving state plans containing work require-
ments which were not arbitrary or unreasonable. Id. at 418-20.
160. Compare id. at 416 with Townsend v. Swank, 404 U.S. 282, 288-90 (1971), and
King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309, 320-25, 332 (1968).
161. 413 U.S. at 413, quothig Schwartz v. Texas, 344 U.S. 199, 202-03 (1952).
162. 413 U.S. at 414.
163. There is some evidence in Dubliw to rebut this inference. The Court's allusion
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rejects the assumption upon which the Rice factors were based-that Congress
cannot be assumed to have concerned itself with the preemption of existing
state law when preoccupied with formulating its own program.
1 4
The Court's rejection of the preemptive significance of the comprehensive
character of the federal program cast further doubt upon the continuing
validity of Rice. The pervasiveness point was regarded as outmoded in the
context of contemporary legislative practice:
The subjects of modern social and regulatory legislation often by
their very nature require intricate and complex responses from the
Congress, but without Congress necessarily intending its enactment as
the exclusive means of meeting the problem .... 165
Like the Court's supposition of congressional consciousness of preemption
problems, this observation mandates a search for specific intent as the sole
determinant of federal occupation of the field.
Dublino is therefore a completely state-directed occupation-of-the-field
case, coupling a protective treatment of state interests and a state presumption
with a doctrinal formulation echoing the pre-Hines-Rice cases.
C. The Conflict Ground
The Court has granted state interests compelling weight in cases raising
conflict issues as well. Although ostensibly concerned with the factual prob-
lem of a conflict's existence, Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp.,10 found much
support for its result in a state-directed balancing of interests.
The issue in Kewanee was whether federal patent law preempted state
trade secret law. In finding no conflict, 67 the Court first considered the ob-
jectives of the federal and state statutes. Whereas the patent law sought to
encourage invention and discovery and ultimate public disclosure, the trade
secret law sought to promote commercial ethics and the development of un-
patentable inventions.1 6s Projecting the impact of uninhibited state action, the
Court found no frustration of the federal purpose.'0 9 The Court failed to find
a conflict in part because of the weight it attached to the states' interests in
maintaining trade secret laws. In the Court's view the speculative encourage-
to appellee's failure to show preemptive intent "expressly or inpliedly," id. at 417 (emphasis
supplied), supports a contrary view. The Court's other pointed remarks about intent,
however, belittle the significance of this statement.
164. See text accompanying note 65 supra.
165. 413 U.S. at 415; but cf. Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal, Inc., 411 U.S. 624,
633 (1973).
166. 416 U.S. 470 (1974).
167. Closely tracking its Goldstein analysis, the Court disposed of the copyright
clause and occupation of the field issues presented. Id. at 478-79; notes 112-136 and
accompanying text supra.
168. 416 U.S. at 480-82.
169. The Court stressed that the more complete protection offered by federal law
would provide a sufficient attraction to owners of inventions of both doubtful and clear
patentability. Id. at 487-90. This negated the risk that those with patentable inventions
would avoid federal protection, and thus deprive the public of ultimate disclosure. Id. at 489.
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ment to seek patents for inventions of doubtful patentability was outweighed
by the harm to state interests that would attend preemption.'70 This protec-
tiveness carried over to the Court's treatment of the facts. Even if the holder
of a clearly patentable invention, as to whom the federal interest in ultimate
public disclosure is greatest, sought state trade secret protection, pressures on
the inventor from the scientific and industrial communities and the march of
technological development would eventually bring the invention into the
public domain.' 71 Once again, then, the Court placed the protection of state
interests above certainty in the accomplishment of federal interests.
By virtue of its finding of no conflict on the facts, Kewanee posed no issue
as to the doctrinal elements of the conflict ground. But other Burger Court
decisions have cut back on the potential conflict standard of the Hines-Rice
line of cases172 and Perez v. Campbell's 73 insistence upon absolute supremacy
whatever the conflict's magnitude.
174
Albeit in a constitutional preemption context, Goldstein's "necessary"
conflict requirement 75 already had indicated the Court's dissatisfaction with
the potential conflict standard. In Dublino a similar narrowing of the con-
flict ground occurred in a statutory preemption context. Although the Court
declined to pass directly upon the conflict, 176 it observed in a footnote that
[c]onflicts, to merit judicial rather than cooperative federal-state
resolution, should be of substance and not merely trivial or insubstan-
tial.177
In remanding the case on the conflict issue, the Court chose not to
examine the statutes for latent conflicts. Arguably then, Dublino presages, if
not heralds, the demise of the "potential" conflict basis for preemptive
findings.'
78
Elsewhere, the Dublino Court reiterated the view that "[t]he exercise of
federal supremacy is not lightly to be presumed." 1 9 The case, therefore, clearly
revives the flexible supremacy principle of Huron and Kesler 80 that the Court
expressly repudiated only two'years previously in Perez. Failure to preempt
in the case of a "merely trivial" conflict would seem indistinguishable from
failure to preempt when the conflict is between a regulatory scheme of sub-
stantial state interest and insubstantial federal concern. For the first time since
170. Id. at 489.
171. Id. at 490-91.
172. See notes 51-53, 80-83 and accompanying text supra.
173. 402 U.S. 637 (1971) ; see text accompanying note 98 supra.
174. See text accompanying note 94 supra.
175. See note 120 and accompanying text supra.
176. 413 U.S. at 422.
177. Id. at 423 n.20. This formulation, which narrows considerably the conflict
ground, may be restricted to federal statutory schemes envisioning state-federal adminis-
trative coordination. Cf. notes 147-149 and accompanying text supra.
178. Cf. Askew v. American Waterways Operations, Inc., 411 U.S. 325 (1973).
179. 413 U.S. at 413, quoting Schwartz v. Texas, 344 U.S. 199, 203 (1952).
180. See notes 35-39 and accompanying text supra.
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Kesler, then, the Supreme Court intimated that a conflict may be allowed to
stand. At the very least, Dublino questions the durability of Perez, and in so
doing reintroduces a principle striking at the foundation of the federal pre-
sumption.
While proposing an approach supportive of flexible supremacy, Dublino
avoided any ruling to that effect by remanding on the conflict issue-in Merrill
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Warel s' a state law survived an ad-
mitted conflict.
A federal-state conflict arose when the respondent, upon leaving the peti-
tioner's employ, forfeited under the terms of the employment contract the
benefits of a noncontributory profit-sharing plan) 8 2 A California statute voided
the forfeiture, but a New York State Exchange Rule,8 3 enacted pursuant to
section 6 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 14 directed arbitration of
any controversy arising from employment termination. The Exchange Rule
also conflicted with a California provision requiring the Court to disregard
arbitration clauses in individual actions for the collection of wages. The
Supreme Court affirmed the California court's judgment for the employee.
In upholding the state law, the Court relied upon several potentially inde-
pendent grounds. Since section 6(c) of the 1934 Actl 5 required that the
Exchange Rules be consistent with applicable law of the state where the ex-
change is located as well as with the Act, the Court argued: "where the
government has provided for collaboration the courts shall not find conflict.' 8 0
But the Court did not rely upon this provision as a dispositive expression of
specific congressional intent to permit concurrent state regulation. 1 7 The
Court proceeded to examine at length the relation between the purpose of the
Rules and the state law at issue. Justice Blackman's opinion for the Court
relied heavily upon the analytical framework established by Silver v. New
York Stock Exchange,'"s a case involving a collision between the Rules and
the federal antitrust laws. As construed in Ware, Silver held that the exchange's
self-regulatory rules should preempt conflicting law "only to the extent neces-
sary to protect the achievement of the aims of the Securities Exchange Act.'
' 8 0
The congressional aim in allowing exchange self-regulation was to insure fair
dealing and to protect investors. 19 0 As the Court found employee arbitration
181. 414 U.S. 117 (1973).
182. Id. at 120.
183. NYSE, CONSTITUTION AND RULES, Rule 345(a) (1) (CCH 1973).
184. 15 U.S.C. § 78f (1970).
185. 15 U.S.C. § 78f(c) (1970).
186. 414 U.S. at 137.
187. To dispose of the case on this basis entailed a determination whether New York,
the state where the exchange is located within the meaning of the Act, would apply
California law to the arbitration question. The Court posed, but declined to decide the
conflict of laws issue presented. Id. at 138.
188. 373 U.S. 341 (1963).
189. 414 U.S. at 127.
190. Id. at 130.
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irrelevant to these ends, it found no preemption under the stated standard. 91
The Court also found that the 1934 Act implied no compelling need for national
uniformity in New York Stock Exchange "housekeeping" rules. 19 2 Con-
cluding that no persuasive reason for preemption was shown, the Court held
that California's strong interest in protecting its wage earners prevailed.' 9 3
Broadly construed, the Ware analysis provides a successor of sorts to
Huron.9 4 The Rules were implicitly admitted to possess preemptive capa-
bility, but only when directly in pursuance of the 1934 Act's policies. 1 5 The
limitation developed in Silver to deal with a conflict between two federal
statutes amounts to a principle of flexible supremacy when transferred to the
federal-state context. In stating arbitration's relation to fair dealing and
investor protection to be "peripheral,"' 96 the Court in effect viewed the con-
flict itself to be peripheral to the federal act's main purpose.
While the Court in Ware might have avoided finding a conflict had it
drawn a distinction between the preemptive capability of a statute and that
of self-regulated exchange exercising authority delegated by the statute, pre-
sumably on the ground that the Exchange Rules are not federal law within
the meaning of the supremacy clause, it failed to decide the case on that
ground.19 7 Ware must therefore be said to have left standing an acknowledged
conflict.
D. A Principled Turn Toward the States
The Burger Court's most recent preemption decisions again raise the
question of whether the doctrine controls the subject matter, or the subject
matter the doctrine. They admit of factual analyses which, if granted disposi-
tive weight, would render the accompanying formulations of the preemption
doctrine post facto rationalizations. But the doctrine, as the embodiment of
the federalist perspectives shared by a majority of the Justices at a given
period of the Court's history, possesses, in varying degrees, force of its own.
Cumulatively considered, the Burger Court decisions show a renewed emphasis
on the state-directed doctrine.
Dissenting in Goldstein, Justice Marshall implied that the majority was
more concerned with a proper result than with the proper application of
191. Id. at 134-36.7
192. Id. at 136.
193. Id. at 139-40.
194. 362 U.S. 440 (1960) ; see note 35 and accompanying text supra.
195. See note 206 and accompanying text infra.
196. 414 U.S. at 135.
197. There is some ambiguity in the opinion on this point, however. In determining
the Exchange Rule's relation to the 1934 Act, the Court said that a rule outside of the
Act's purpose "would not appear to fall under the . . .federal umbrella; it is instead
subject to applicable state law." Id. at 131. Taken alone, this language suggests that
preemptive capability under the supremacy clause had been denied altogether to peripheral
Exchange Rules. While the Court could have decided the case on this ground, it relied
instead on conventional preemption analysis.
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existing principles. 198 Admittedly, in the absence of federal legislation, pre-
emption of state remedies would amount to an undesirable carte blanche for
the record pirate. But since Congress enacted a prohibition against record
piracy effective after the events in the case, preemption at worst would entail
the release of one defendant. The Court was free to follow its conceptual
inclinations without concern for adverse policy ramifications.
The factual conclusion that copyright, then, may be local in character,
was not the result of a strained effort to bring about a desired result; rather,
it was the product of an exacting attitude toward the copyright clause's inherent
preemptive capability. It was the Court's restraint in fashioning exclusive
federal power out of the Constitution, rather than its analyses of the subject
matter per se, which proved controlling in this case.
The ambiguity of Dublino lies in the very strength of the state interest
at issue. Although the result may be attributed to the Court's imposition of
the strict intent formulation, its abandonment of the federal presumption can
also be explained as a change in its assessment of the challenged state statute.
The rejected rule of Townsend v. Swank, 99 itself an extrapolation from the
result of the precursing King v. Smith,200 rested on a different balance of
federal-state interests. The Court in King struck down a state regulation
which excluded from the AFDC program children whose mothers cohabited
with men, relying in part upon the view that the state's interest in discouraging
illicit sexual conduct was not a legitimate one in the context of AFDC
policy.201 Arguably, the invalid state exclusion of college students in Swank
and that of children of parents absent for military service in Carleson v. Rentil-
lard202 involved similarly questionable state interests. Given the Court's posi-
tive reaction to the state interests involved, Dublino presented circumstances
inapposite to the Swank rule. To have required a showing of intent not to
preempt would have foreclosed protection of a perceived legitimate state inter-
est.
The Court in Dublino went beyond merely finding a failure of proof of
congressional intent to preempt in the face of the strength of the state interest
and the cooperative nature of the statutory scheme. The Court was interested
in more than the specific result of the case. Rather than achieve the desired out-
come by simply transferring the burden of proof to the supporters of the
federal program, the Court sought to depart from the theoretical premises of
the federal presumption by scaling down the intent standard, and rejecting
pervasiveness and potential conflict as preemptive grounds.2 13 Dublino thus
198. 412 U.S. at 578-79.
199. 404 U.S. 282 (1971) ; see notes 154-158 and accompanying text sutpra.
200. 392 U.S. 309 (1968).
201. Id. at 325-27.
202. 406 U.S. 598, 599-600 (1972).
203. See notes 185-187 and accompanying text supra.
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sought to have an impact on doctrine separable from its facts, and supports the
general proposition that the preemption doctrine possesses independent influ-
ence.
In Ware the Court made its most concerted effort to reformulate doctrine,
and in so doing indicated a possible point of departure for future changes in
preemption's theoretical foundations. The Court expressed its
conviction that the proper approach is to reconcile "the operation
of both statutory schemes with one another rather than holding one
completely ousted.
'20 4
By asserting this cooperative approach to be harmonious with preemption
decisions "extending back to the turn of the century," 20 5 the Court thus in-
corporated it into the doctrine as a whole.
20 6
Taken as a declaration of policy, Justice Blackmun's statement in Ware
seems to indicate that the Court's reliance upon the presence or absence of
explicit congressional directives, characteristic of Goldstein and Dublino, may
be giving way to a more active disposition to effectuate cooperative results. He
did not suggest, however, how the Court might accomplish this within the
confines of article III, other than by refusing to preempt in unclear cases and
by placing the burden of tying up any loose ends on Congress.
207
E. Suntnary-The Present Disposition
The Burger Court's preemption decisions cannot be viewed as a doctrinal
monolith. In Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal, Inc., 20 8 decided shortly
before Goldstein, Dublino, Ware and Kewanee, the Court found federal avia-
tion regulation preemptive of Burbank's curfew on late night flights. Burbank
suggests that the return to a state-directed presumption may not be a complete
reversal of prior decisions.
The Burbank majority, citing Rice to the effect that specific intent is not
required, based its preemptive decision upon a fraction of a contradictory body
of legislative history and the pervasiveness of federal regulation of aviation.20 9
204. 414 U.S. at 127, quoting Silver v. New York Stock Exchange, 373 U.S. 341, 357
(1963). See also the inference of cooperative purpose drawn from a congressional expres-
sion of intent not to preempt in Askew v. American Waterways Operators, Inc., 411 U.S.
325, 332, 336 (1973).
205. 414 U.S. at 127 n.8.
206. Although a cooperative objective can be inferred from previous state-directed
cases, see text accompanying note 107 supra, Ware represents the Court's first explicit
statement of this view.
207. Given Justice Blackmun's failure to reconcile the mandate to achieve cooperative
results with the limits of judicial power under article III, the practical impact of Ware's
cooperative principle may be indistinguishable from that of the state-directed presumption
of the present Court.
208. 411 U.S. 624 (1973). See generall y Comment, City of Burbank v. Lockheed Air
Terminal, Inc.: Federal Preemptionr of Aircraft Noise Regulation and the Future of
Proprietary Restrictions, 4 N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 99 (1974).
209. 411 U.S. at 633. 636-37, 638.
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Three Justices joined Justice Rehnquist in dissent, 210 rejecting preemption
founded upon implied intent, and reiterating the strict intent standard.
211
Untempered generalizations have been inappropriate to preemption for
at least the past fifty years. Preemption's diversity and breadth of application
make abstract principles only the roughest of guides. A certain subject matter
can bring Justices to an unexpected side of a controversy.212 Former ap-
proaches have been used contemporaneously with developing ones, 213 and
direct overruling has been rare. What matters, along with the subject matter
at hand, are dominant and long-sustained attitudes toward federalism. Burbank,
read in conjunction with two emphatically preemptive decisions of 1971, Pere.-
v. Campbell214 and Amalgamated Association of Street, Electric Railway &
Motor Coach Employees v. Lockridge,215 constitutes a climax in the dominance
of the federally protective approach. The abrupt turnabout in Goldstein,
followed by three similarly state-directed opinions, each in turn composed by
a recent appointee to the Court, presage a state protective approach in the
immediate future.
Goldstein, Dublino, Kewanee and Ware bespeak concerted effort to re-
turn preemption to a state-directed posture. The first two overrule, and the
third at least questions, existing applications of the federal presumption to
their respective fields. Goldstein and Dublino carry state-directed principles
outside of the commerce power and reapply them in the copyright and
spending contexts. This perhaps reverses the practice begun in Hines of in-
voking the federal presumption to support federal power resting on bases other
than the commerce clause. Dublino tailors a rule for cooperative statutory
210. They were Justices Marshall, Stewart and White. Since this leaves Justice
Douglas in the majority with Chief Justice Burger, and Justices Blackmun and Powell,
the authors of the Goldstein, Ware and Dublino opinions, respectively, it is possible that
the proper formulation of preemption doctrine was uppermost only in the minds of Jus-
tices Douglas and Rehnquist. The division is best explained in terms of the regulatory
issue. The majority opted against the disruption of air traffic caused by the municipality's
curfew on late night take-offs. Id. at 628. The dissenters, on the other hand, may have
considered, in the face of contradictory legislative history, compare id. at 632-33 (majority
opinion) with id. at 640-41 (dissenting opinion), that the balance of interests lay with
the local attempt to control noise pollution. Cf. id. at 643-44.
211. Id. at 643.
212. Compare Justice Marshall's dissenting opinions in Goldstein v. California, 412
U.S. 546, 576 (1973) and New York State Dep't of Social Services v. Dublino, 413 U.S.
405, 423 (1973), with his concurrence in dissent in Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal,
Inc., 411 U.S. 624, 640 (1973) ; Justice Frankfurter's concurrence in dissent in Huron
Portland Cement Co. v. City of Detroit, 362 U.S. 440 (1960) with his opinion in Kesler
v. Department of Public Safety, 369 U.S. 153 (1962) ; or his dissent in Farmers Educ. &
Cooperative Union of America v. WDAY, Inc., 360 U.S. 525 (1959) with his opinion
in San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236 (1959) ; Justice Douglas'
opinion in Electrical Workers Local 1111 v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Bd., 315
U.S. 740 (1942) with his opinion in Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218 (1947).
213. Compare Electrical Workers Local 1111 v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Bd,,
315 U.S. 740 (1942) and California v. Zook, 336 U.S. 725 (1949), discussed at note 33
supra, with Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52 (1941), discussed at notes 43-52 and ac-
companying text supra, and Cloverleaf Butter Co. v. Patterson, 315 U.S. 148 (1942),
discussed at notes 58-59 and accompanying text supra.
214. 402 U.S. 637 (1971); see notes 97-99 and accompanying text supra.
215. 403 U.S. 274 (1971); see note 74 supra.
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schemes, and Ware goes beyond the state presumption entirely to state a
general policy favoring cooperative solutions.
The cases touch all comers of the doctrine. Goldstein and Kewanee indi-
cate at least a diminished inclination toward reading overwhelming national
needs into subject matter, and at most an aggressiveness in arriving at local
characterizations. The Court refused to infer congressional intent to preempt
in any of the four cases, and in Dublino particularly reestablished a specific
intent requirement. In all of the cases, either the absence of specific intent or
the fact of congressional silence allowed the Court to protect the states' inter-
ests by filling in the gap with a presumption in their favor. Two long-standing
preemptive conditions-pervasiveness and potential conflict-have been re-
examined. As to the former, the Court indicated its protective attitude toward
state power by depriving complex federal regulatory schemes of any prima
facie preemptive implications. If the questioning of the latter leads to its per-
manent rejection, the conflict ground will be thrust back to being merely the
correlative of specific intent to occupy the field embodied in the "actual" con-
flict standard.
While no single preemption case is likely to provide adequate guidance
for predicting the course of future decisions, a series of cases resting on
diverse subject matter, but carrying the doctrine in a common direction, is a
more reliable gauge of the Court's sentiment. The Burger Court's most recent
decisions suggest that where Congress has not made clear its intention to
preempt, or where a conflict is unripe or peripheral to the purpose of the
federal statute, state legislation will be allowed to stand.
CONCLUSION
Divergent inferences can be drawn from the federal system's division of
governmental authority between the nation and the states. These characteriza-
tions provide support for both the preemption doctrine and its counter doctrine.
If one views federal and state governments as cooperative partners, action
taken by one need not imply the other's displacement. Both the Court's state-
directed refusal to presume preemption, and its requirement of proof of con-
gressional preemptive intent, comport with this concept. But if one views the
multi-tiered system as demanding of protection of the federal tier, preemption
assumes a different form. The security of federal operations bdcomes the im-
perative, to be assured through resort to policy considerations, sensitivity to
national interests and a presumption of the need for exclusivity.
Historically, the former concept and doctrine lost vitality as the latter
ascended, lending in turn to each side of the doctrine the appearance of
absoluteness. But the contradiction posed by the accepted coexistence of these
principles cannot be avoided entirely. Differing approaches to federalism here
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provide only a partial explanation. Between the philosophic poles arise cases
for decision which stress the needs of the particular subject matter and regu-
latory scheme in question. The outcome may hinge upon the degree to which
these needs recommend themselves to the federalist perspective of a majority
of the justices. The principled result, however, finds the doctrine not stated in
relation to the merits, but absolutely. Unqualified preemption rules, in turn,
carry the Court to undesirable extremes. Erecting a presumption in either
direction, federal or state, leads to decision with diminished reference to the
interests at stake.
Forceful arguments have been made in favor of a strict intent standard.
To preempt where Congress is silent and has not in terms covered the field
creates a gap in needed regulation and leaves the state powerless to fill it.
Permitting state regulation still allows Congress the option to reverse tie
Court legislatively. The recurring question is whether these mutually exclusive
principles need to be embodied in an absolute rule. That is the disposition of
the present Court, although its desire to decide in accord with general prin-
ciples is undercut by its equally basic instinct to proceed in a case-by-case
fashion in this area. As adherence to a consistent principle in the form of rules
seems to be impossible in this area, perhaps the most principled approach
would result if consistency's very impossibility were recognized, and a case-
by-case approach openly adopted. This would involve relegating the dualistic
sets of rules that have developed around the occupation-of-the-field and conflict
grounds to the status of variable factors, for use as aids for, but not in place of,
balancing the federal and state interests. Obviously, a compelling display of
congressional intent would be disposit'ive, but a strict intent requirement should
not be applied so as to override a demonstrated, albeit unexecuted, federal
interest. On the other hand, federal supremacy, always protectable by Con-
gress, should not-despite regulatory pervasiveness, potential or peripheral
conflict-constrict the Court's ability to protect important state interests.
Ware suggests a general perspective on federalism suitable here. Rather than
to protect interests and check incursions into the various governmental do-
mains, the better conception has the Court promoting cooperation among them
wherever possible.
William W. Bratton, Jr.
